Last Wednesday, the South Carolina Supreme Court agreed with me that an insurance company cannot contractually eliminate a resident relative’s ability to stack underinsurance motorist coverage from other companies. Continue reading
These posts return to an outline suggested by Wilson R.Huhn’s book, The Five Types of Legal Argument. Huhn identifies five sources of legal arguments, including arguments based on text and those based on the drafters’ intent.
South Carolina largely treats the two the same in that text is the best evidence of intent. Grier v. AMISUB of South Carolina, Inc., 397 S.C. 532, 535, 725 S.E.2d 693, 695 (2012). Earlier posts explored this and other South Carolina canons of textual construction. The summary is available here.
Huhn identifies other evidence of intent from the text’s 1) earlier versions, 2) history, 3) official commentary, and 4) contemporaneous commentary. South Carolina courts use most of these tools — if a statute is ambiguous. Continue reading
Posts over the past several weeks have annotated with South Carolina law the canons of textual construction that Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner identified in their book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts.
This is the tenth post annotating with South Carolina law the canons of construction that Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner describe in Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. This post describes how South Carolina handles what the book on page xvii describes as falsities. Continue reading
This post continues to annotate with South Carolina law cannons of construction that Justice Antonin Scalia and Bryan A. Garner describe in their book, Reading Law: The Interpretation of Legal Texts. This post quotes the canons from pages xv and xvi of the book, followed by the South Carolina annotations. Continue reading